Abstract. Interorganizational worfklows represent workflows which involve several business processes, belonging to different organizations, which need to coordinate thier actions in order to achieve a common goal. This paper proposes a Petri net model which permits the modelling and verification of interorganizational workflows. The model allows the explicit representation of the organizational dimension of each component workflow, the shared use of resources among different organizations as well as the specification of security constraints. A property of soundness, which describes the correct execution of the interorganizational workflow, is defined and proven decidable.
Introduction
A workflow is defined as a set of coordinated tasks that take place inside an organization in order to achieve a common business objective. Tasks may be carried out by resources (such as human users) and they involve specific data. Thus, several aspects (dimensions) of a workflow can be identified: the process dimension (which specifies the order of tasks), the organizational dimension, the data-flow dimension. Interorganizational workflows consist of several workflows belonging to different organizations, which execute independently but need to coordinate their actions at certain points, in order to accomplish a common goal.
One direction in the current research related to interorganizational workflows aims at finding suitable formal models to permit their specification and the analysis of properties such as the correct execution. These issues become increasingly difficult to address when considering details related to the organizational aspect of the workflows and security constraints. Among the formal methods which have been proposed for modelling interorganizational workflows, Petri nets present the advantage of an intuitive graphical representation, besides their formal semantics. Their use has been proposed in: [2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 15, 16] . The approaches in [2, 3, 8, 12, 18 ] study a soundness property describing the correct execution of interorganizational workflows, but do not address the organizational dimension of the component workflows and do not impose security constraints. The organizational aspect is considered in [5, 17, 19] . The correctness problem is only studied in [17] , which proposes a nested Petri net model, but does not include security constraints. The importance of considering security constraints for interorganizational workflows has been emphasized in papers like ( [6, 11, 16] ), but few approaches consider the verification of the correct execution under security constraints. The approach in [6] uses Petri nets for describing the interorganizational workflow, allows the specification of the organizational aspect and of security constraints, but does not address any correctness issues. In [11] , the authors provide access control mechanisms inside the component organizations and use Petri nets for verification, but only in the process dimension. In [16] , multilevel security features are included in the interorganizational workflow and the soundness property is discussed, but the approach abstracts from the organizational dimension of workflows.
This paper introduces Nested Interorganizational Workflow Nets (NIWF-nets) -an approach for the modelling of interorganizational workflows which permits the specification of security constraints. In our organizational model, permissions to execute certain tasks are associated to roles, where a role represents a class of users with similar capabilities. In order to increase flexibility and efficiency, we allow certain roles to be used by external organizations for the execution of tasks. Our model permits the enforcing of security constraints: we consider separation of duties constraints (SOD), which have been identified as an efficient mechanism to prevent fraud inside an organization ( [4, 7, 13] ). Such constraints can specify that a user who executed a task in the current workflow instance, cannot execute a set of other tasks, in order to prevent fraudulent actions of the user. SOD constraints are particularly useful when certain roles are involved in executing tasks from different organizations, as they can be used to avoid conflict of interests and undesired access to sensitive information.
Our approach is based on nested Petri nets ( [14] ), in which tokens may be Petri nets themseleves (object-nets). In our model, there exist object-nets for every local workflow and every role in each organization. The role-nets will incorporate the mechanisms needed to enforce the SOD constraints. The commnication between component workflows is modelled using a communication net. We will define and analyze a soundness property which describes the correct execution of the interorganizational workflow, under security and resource constraints.
Nested Interorganizational Workflow Nets
In this section we propose a model for interorganizational workflows, NIWF-nets (nested interorganizational workflow nets), based on nested Petri nets ( [14] ).
We will first present an introductory example of our model. We consider an interorganizational workflow which consists of two workflows, W F 1 and W F 2 . W F 1 belongs to a company which manufactures products, which are designed by W F 2 . The existing roles are: Analyst and Clerk in W F 1 and Designer in Fig.1) a Clerk sends the product specifications to W F 2 (t 1 ). Upon receiving a request, in W F 2 a Designer designs the product (t 6 ). Then, the cost of the product is established by an Analyst and the project is sent to W F 1 (t 7 ). After receiving the project, in W F 1 an Analyst role can decide the internal production (t 2 ) or that components of the product should be made by external partners (t 3 ). After the components are received by a Clerk (t 4 ), the production can be started (t 5 -does not require a role for its execution). The coordination of the two workflows is described using the dependency relation between tasks: D = {(t 1 , t 6 ), (t 7 , t 2 ), (t 7 , t 3 )}. Thus, task t 6 should fire after t 1 , and t 2 , t 3 after t 7 in W F 2 . In order to avoid conflict of interests, since t 2 and t 3 in W F 1 and t 7 in W F 2 are executed by an Analyst role, one should impose that t 2 (t 3 ) in W F 1 and t 7 in W F 2 should not all be executed by the same user with the Analyst role. Thus, the SOD constraints consist of one rule:
In the N IW F -net in Fig. 1 , there exist several object-nets: W F 1 and W F 2 are Petri nets describing the process aspect of the workflows. Given the relation D, the communication object CM (D) contains transitions corresponding to the transitions involved in D. A transition t d in CM (D) has a label l if its corresponding task t has the label l. For every role r, there exists a role-net, RN (r). Since the Analyst role can execute t 2 , t 3 and t 7 , there exist corresponding transitions in RN (Analyst), with labels matching those of t 2 , t 3 and t 7 (l 2 , l 3 , l 7 ). Because of the SOD rule, t 7r has as input places the input places of t 2r and t 3r . The system net SN consists of two places for W F 1 and W F 2 , a place for each role and a place for CM (D). The transitions in SN move the role-nets between the role places and the workflow places. In the marking in Fig.1 , t 1 in W F 1 and t 6 in W F 2 are enabled. Because t 6 is labelled and it is involved in D, this means it can only fire at the same time with t 6r in RN (Designer) and t 6d in CM (D) (i.e. there should be a Designer role available at P W F2 and the communication module should permit the firing of this task). Since t 6d is not enabled, t 6 cannot be executed. If T 1 fires in SN , a user with the role Clerk is moved to place P W F1 . Now, a synchronization step (t 1 , t 1r , t 1d ) is enabled and its firing adds tokens to places p 1 , d 1 and to the output place of t 1r . After a role-net RN (Designer) is moved to place P W F2 by firing T 4 , the synchronization step (t 6 , t 6r , t 6d ) is also enabled. Assume that an Analyst role-net has been moved to place P W F2 , the synchronization step (t 7 , t 7r , t 7d ) fired (i.e an analyst executed t 7 ) and than the Analyst role-net is moved back to place Analyst. In the marking of this objectnet ob 2 = (RN (Analyst), m 1 ), there are no tokens in the input places of its transitions. The same analyst cannot execute t 2 in W F 2 : if T 2 fires and ob 2 is moved to P W F1 , although t 2d is enabled in CM (D), t 2r is not enabled in ob 2 .
In what follows, we will define the specification of an interorganizational workflow, and than, the NIWF-net associated to it.
Each component workflow is executed inside an organization, which must define the roles responsible with the execution of tasks. Several users can be assigned to each role. We permit the existance of external roles: the users assigned to these roles can execute tasks belonging to other workflows. The interaction between the component workflows is specified using a partial relation on those tasks which need to be coordinated. Separation of duties rules can be defined in order to ensure the secure execution of the interorganizational workflow. If a role is authorized to execute several tasks (within or outside the organization), one can restrict a user with this role to execute some possible conflicting tasks.
Thus, a specification S for an interorganizational workflows is a tuple S =< WF , Roles, roles, D, SOD > such that: -WF = {W F 1 , . . . , W F n } is the set of all the component workflows. Let T be the set of all the tasks in these workflows.
-Roles is the set of all the roles in the component workflows.
Roles is a function which specifies, for a task, the set of roles which are permitted to execute it.
-the dependency relation D ⊆ T × T is a partial order which defines the dependency between tasks belonging to different workflows. If (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ D, this means that t 1 must execute before t 2 .
-SOD is the set of separation of duties rules: a SOD rule t → ¬(t 1 , . . . , t k ) specifies that, if a certain user with a role r authorized to execute tasks t, t 1 , . . . , t k , executes t, then it cannot execute anylonger none of the tasks t 1 , . . . , t k . Also, if the user executes one of t 1 , . . . , t k , he cannot execute t. If t → ¬(t 1 , . . . t k ), then it also holds that t i → ¬(t), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Tasks t, t 1 , . . . , t k could belong to different workflows. SOD rules can be used to avoid fraudulent actions of a user inside one organization, but also to avoid conflict of interests, if a user executes sensitive tasks in different organizations. We will use workflow-nets (WF-nets [1] ) to model the process dimension of workflows. A WF-net contains two special places, i and o, such that •i = ∅ and o• = ∅ and every element in the net belongs to a path from i to o. The marking with one token in place i (denoted by i) is the initial marking of the net, while the marking with one token in o (denoted by o) is the final marking.
We will model each W F k ∈ WF by a WF-net. i k is the initial place of W F k . Given a specification S and a role r ∈ Roles, the corresponding role-net RN (r) = (P, T, F ) is obtained as follows: -T = {t r |∃t ∈ T : r ∈ roles(t)} -P = ∪ tr ∈T {in tr , out tr } -for each t r : (in tr , t r ), (t r , out tr ) ∈ F ; for each t r such that t → ¬(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ SOD, let in tir be the input places of the transition ti r corresponding to ti in  RN (r), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, (in t1r , t r ) , . . . , (in tnr , t r ) ∈ F An initial marking for RN (r), denoted by mr 0 , contains one token in every input place. For each task that can be executed by a role r, there exists a corresponding transition t r with one input place and one output place. If there exists a SOD rule involving the tasks which can be executed by r, t → ¬(t1, . . . , tn) , then let t r , t1 r , . . . tn r be the transitions corresponding to the tasks in the rule. The input places of t1 r , . . . tn r are connected to t r , hence the firing of t r prevents t1 r , . . . tn r from firing. Also, if any transition ti r fires, it disables t r , which is consistent with the fact that t i and t r cannot be executed by the same role. Thus, SOD constraints will be enforced through the structure of RN (r).
Given a specification S, a communication net associated to the dependency
, is defined as follows: -P D = {p d |d ∈ D}: a place for each pair of dependent tasks.
An initial marking for CM (D), denoted by md 0 , is the empty marking.
Definition 1. Given a specification < WF , Roles, roles, D, SOD >, a nested interorganizational workflow net, N IW F , is a tuple N IW F = (V ar, W F nets, Role nets, CM (D), SN, L, λ) such that:
-V ar = {x r |r ∈ Roles} is the set of variables in the net. 
∈ F SN and all these arcs are labelled with the variable x r .
-M 0 assigns marked object-nets to the places of SN :
-λ is a partial labelling function on transitions, such that: -tasks in the workflows can have a label from L W F -for each t ∈ T , r ∈ Role(t), let t r be the transition corresponding to t in
A net-token is a marked object-net. Let A net be the set of all net tokens. A marking of N IW F is a function M which assigns to each place P a multiset of net-tokens:
Let T a transition in SN , P its input place and P its output place. Let P r ∈ {P, P } be the corresponding role place connected to it and var(T ) = x r , where x r is the variable labelling the arc between P r and T . 
Then, we say that Y = (t, t , t ) (or Y = (t, t ), if t does not exist) represents a synchronization step enabled in marking M . The resulting marking, M , is obtained from M by replacing in M (P ) the net-token α 1 with the net-token α 1 = (EN 1 , m 1 ) , the net-token α 2 with the net-token
If t in α 1 has a label l ∈ L W F , then α 1 is a WF-net. If t in α 2 has a label l , then α 2 is a role-net and t is a transition t r corresponding to t. If there exists t in CM (D) with a label l (i.e. t = t d and t is involved in external interaction with transitions from other workflows) t should be enabled and t, t and t must fire synchronously, that is: a user assigned to role r, when executing task t, interacts with the communication module (sends a message) in order to check if the external conditions for executing the task are met. A final marking of a NIWF-net is a marking in which all the object rolenets reside in their initial places and each workflow place only contains the corresponding workflow, in a final marking. We denote by M f the set of final markings. A marking in the set M f is reachable iff all the component workflows successfully ended their execution, even when their behaviour is restricted by the SOD and resource constraints and by the communication mechanisms.
Verification of Interorganizational Workflows

Definition 2. A nested interorganizational workflow net N IW F is sound iff:
(1) (W F j , i j ) is a sound workflow net, ∀j ∈ {1 , . . . , n}. Condition (4) requires that the participant workflows should not be allowed to send an infinite number of messages to the communication module.
Using the results from [9, 14] , it can be proven that the boundedness problem is decidable for NIWF-nets. Also, it holds:
Lemma 1. Assume N IW F is a NIWF-net, such that all the component WFnets are sound. Then, N IW F is bounded iff the communication net is bounded.
Theorem 1. The soundness is decidable for NIWF-nets.
Condition (1) in Def. 2 is decidable ( [1] ). Condition (2) is also decidable (it is decidable for general nested Petri nets: [14] ). The boundness of N IW F is decidable. If (1) holds and N IW F is unbounded, then condition (4) does not hold (Theorem 1), so the NIWF-net is not sound. If N IW F is bounded, then (4) holds and [M 0 is finite. Since M f is finite, condition (3) is also decidable.
